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In a four-treatment experiment, we test some of the hypotheses in García-Gallego et al.
(2004) concerning competition among a number of firms of which some (or all) are in-
dexed by a price-comparison engine facilitating buyers’ search process. In this paper, we
isolate individual behavior from noise due to other players’ actions and learning, facing
each subject with simulated rivals whose prices are extracted from mixed strategy equi-
librium distributions. We find systematic deviations from both theoretical distributions and
previous data obtained in sessions where all players were human. Specifically, departures of
experimental data from the corresponding theoretical predictions are enhanced in this set-
ting as compared to our previous research in which all agents were represented by human
players. This suggests that the divergence between theoretical and observed price reported
there should not be attributed to noisy learning and strategic uncertainty due to subjects’ in-
teraction with other players. Furthermore, economic tests on players’ risk attitudes oganize
pricing behavior in meaningful, although not always compatible, ways.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A Search Engine is a program that accesses and reads Internet pages, stores the results, and
returns lists of pages, which match keywords in a query. Price-Comparison search engines,
also known as shopping agents or shopping robots, are a class of search engines, which crawl
commercial Internet sites. In addition to addresses from vendors, they also collect and display
other information like prices, or return policies.
Presumably, the larger the number of vendors whose price a search engine lists on its site,
and that thereby consumers can easily compare, the more competitive the market becomes.
However, there are several technical reasons for search engines to cover only a small subset
of the Internet, and to collect and report information biased in favor of certain vendors. The
technology-induced tendency, for search engines to have incomplete and biased coverage, is re-
inforced by economic reasons. Search engines are profit-seeking institutions, which draw their
income from vendors, either in the form of placement fees, sales commissions, or advertising.
Well before automated price-comparison search engines appeared on the Internet, economists
had recognized the importance of buyers’ search costs for the functioning of oligopolistic mar-
kets. For example, models like Varian (1980), Burdett and Judd (1983) or Stahl (1989) demon-
strate that any arbitrarily small search cost could yield monopoly pricing by competing sellers.
Obviously, there are alternative approaches in the literature which assume buyer heterogene-
ity as far as search costs are concerned. In the presence of buyer heterogeneity mixed price
equilibria may emerge. Such equilibria are often used as the theoretical counterpart of empir-
ical evidence on persistent price dispersion. An interesting special case of such heterogeneity
is one in which for a fraction of the consumer population search is costless, whereas the re-
maining population have identical positive search costs. Under this assumption, models like the
one in Stahl show that mixed strategy equilibrium price distributions range from monopoly to
competitive (Bertrand) levels as the fraction of zero search cost buyers varies from 0 to 1.
Recently, the use of the Internet and the existence of price-comparison search engines
largely characterize the properties of the search process followed by individual buyers. Specif-
ically, buyers may be heterogeneous depending on whether they gather price information on
the Internet or not. This fact is tested by empirical results reported by Iyer and Pazgal (2000).
Furthermore, search engines may offer incomplete or even biased coverage of competing firms’
prices, as reported in Kephart and Greenwald (1999).
Baye and Morgan (2001) from a theoretical perspective, as well as Brynjolfsson and Smith
(2000) from an empirical point of view, confirm the prediction of persistent price dispersion in
Internet markets, even in the presence of homogeneous products.
From an experimental perspective, in a setup similar to ours but assuming complete cov-
erage, Morgan et al. (2005) study the case of a consumer population consisting of Internet
searchers and captive clients. Some systematic deviations between theoretical and experimen-
tal results are attributed by the authors to uncontrolled idiosyncratic features of their subjects.
However, biases of price-comparison search engines and the effect of incompleteness of the
price index were first explored in García et al. (2004), GGPP hereafter. In that paper, we pro-
pose a partial equilibrium search model, related to Burdett and Judd (1983) and Varian (1980),
to discuss the implications of price-comparison search engines providing consumers with in-
complete and biased information. It is assumed that there is a Price-Comparison search engine,
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which in the benchmark case has complete coverage, i.e., lists the prices of all vendors present
in the market. There is a finite number of identical vendors. There is a large number of con-
sumers of two types. Shoppers use the price-comparison search engine, and buy at the lowest
price listed by the search engine. Non-Shoppers buy from a vendor chosen at random. Vendors
choose prices. In equilibrium, vendors randomize between charging a higher price and selling
only to non-shoppers, and charging a lower price to try to sell also to shoppers.
Parallel to GGPP, Cason and Datta (2005) experimentally study price dispersion in a model
in which buyer search is costly and firms’ strategic spaces include advertising. Some systematic
failures of observed strategies to converge towards the theoretical predictions are explained
as the result of noise created by simultaneously interacting human subjects learning in and
about their market environment. Cason and Datta (2006), simulate buyers’ optimal strategies in
order to isolate behavior on the supply side from uncontrolled effects caused by human action
on both sides of the market. This strategy somehow relates to our present design in which
all but one firms’ behavior are simulated by the server in order to isolate purely idiosyncratic
features of individual decision making from uncontrolled beliefs subjects may hold on others’
risk preferences and actions as well as from the noise created by others’ simultaneous actions
and learning.
In this study, we use the search model in GGPP to discuss individual pricing behavior in the
presence of price comparison search engines providing consumers with complete or incomplete
but unbiased information on the prices available in the market. In GGPP, the model was tested
in a series of experimental sessions, in which random matching and strategic interaction among
a number of human subjects created an environment in which some risk-related elements of
human behavior were controlled, while others were not. In fact, given that the predictions of
the theoretical model accounted for equilibrium price dispersion assuming risk neutrality of
all the agents involved, some deviations between theoretical predictions and the experimental
results were partially offered an explanation by our subjects’ risk attitudes, which significantly
deviated from risk neutrality.
The present study extends the GGPP analysis in two different ways.
First, we aim at studying individual behavior in isolation of factors concerning the behav-
ior of “others” and subjects’ uncontrolled beliefs with respect to rival risk preferences and thus
pricing behavior. In order to do that, we run experimental sessions in which rather than using in-
teracting human agents, we face each subject with a market in which the behavior of “others” is
simulated and corresponds to realizations of a random variable distributed according to equilib-
rium price distributions. This is an important step towards a better understanding of individual
behavior in the presence of mixed strategy equilibrium play in isolation of other uncontrolled
sources of uncertainty related with the subject-matching protocol and the typology of human
behavior or subjects’ beliefs regarding such typology.
A second extension of the design in GGPP is proposed with respect to the parallel test
used in order to identify our subjects’ risk attitudes. In GGPP we use a single test of risk
attitudes: the lottery panel test introduced in Sabater and Georgantzís (2002), which was found
to produce a two-dimensional description of risk attitudes leading to the construction of two
significant explanatory variables (a continuous and a dichotomous one) for the observed pricing
behavior. However, given the fact that the aforementioned test is rather new, our previous results
are difficult to compare with other tests of risk attitudes and their relation to decision making
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in strategic environments. In fact, it would be a rather surprising coincidence that a single
test of risky behavior could capture the whole spectrum of human attitudes towards uncertain
decisions. Therefore, in this study, we propose a more complete test of risky decision making,
by introducing (apart from the aforementioned lottery-panel test) a more standard economic test
inspired in Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) and two psychometric ones due to Zuckerman (1978)
and Torrubia et al. (2001).
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We briefly discuss the features and results of the theoretical setting in GGPP.
Consider an electronic market for a homogeneous search good that opens for 1 period. There
are: 1 price comparison search engine, n ≥ 3 vendors, which we index through subscript j =
1, . . . ,n, and many consumers. The Price-Comparison Search Engine, lists the firms contained
in its Index, and the prices they charge.
Denote by k, the number of vendors the price-comparison search engine indexes. We will
refer to k as the Size of the Index. The search engine has Complete Coverage if it indexes all
vendors present in the market: k = n. If k < n, the search engine indexes each of the n vendors
with the same probability: k/n.
There is a unit measure continuum of risk neutral consumers. Each consumer has a unit
demand, and a reservation price of 1. There are 2 types of consumers, differing only with
respect to whether they use the price-comparison search engine. Non-Shoppers, a proportion λ
in (0,1) of the consumer population, do not use the price-comparison search engine, perhaps
because they are unaware of its existence, or perhaps because of the high opportunity cost of
their time. The other consumers, Shoppers, use the price-comparison search engine.
Consumers do not know the prices charged by individual vendors. Shoppers use the price-
comparison search engine to learn the prices of vendors. If the lowest price sampled by the
price-comparison search engine is no higher than 1, shoppers accept the offer and buy; in case
of a tie they distribute themselves randomly among vendors; otherwise they reject the offer and
exit the market. Non-shoppers distribute themselves evenly across vendors, i.e., each vendor
has a share of non-shoppers of 1/n. If offered a price no higher than 1, non-shoppers accept the
offer and buy; otherwise they reject the offer and exit the market.
Vendors are identical and risk neutral. Marginal costs are constant and equal to zero. Ven-
dors know the functioning rules of the search engine. They know the probability with which
they are indexed, but do not observe the identity of the indexed vendors, before choosing prices.
Denote byΠ j(p), the expected profit of vendor j when it charges price p on R+0 . A vendor’s
strategy is a cumulative distribution function over prices, Fj(·). Denote the lowest and highest
prices on its support by
¯
p j and p¯ j.1 A vendor’s payoff is its expected profit.
ANash equilibrium is a n-tuple of cumulative distribution functions over prices, {F1(·), . . . ,Fn(·)},
such that for some Π?j on R
+
0 , and j = 1, . . . ,n, Π j(p) = Π
?
j , for all p on the support of Fj(·),
and Π j(p)≤Π?j , for all p.
Denote by τ the type of the search engine, and let ‘c’, mean Complete Coverage, and ‘u’
mean Unbiased Incomplete Coverage. Then, τ belongs to {c,u,}. We will use superscripts ‘c’
1. It is well known that this game has no equilibrium in pure strategies.
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and ‘u’ to denote variables or values associated with the cases where the search engine has that
type. Denote by φ τj the probability of firm j being indexed, such that φ
τ
j = k/n. Denote by pˆ− j
the minimum price charged by any indexed vendor other than vendor j, and denote by mˆ− j the
number of indexed vendors that charge pˆ− j. Ignoring ties, the expected profit of a vendor that
charges p≤ 1 is:
Π j(p) = p
λ
n
+ p(1−λ )φ τj [1−F(p)]k−1. (1)
Denote by lτj the lowest price vendor j is willing to charge to sell to both types of consumers
when the search engine has type τ , i.e., lτj [λ/n+(1−λ )φ τj ]−λ/n≡ 0.
Then, it is shown that, in equilibrium:
p
λ
n
+ p(1−λ )φ τj [1−Fτj (p)]k−1 =
λ
n
. (2)
All vendors are indexed with positive probability (including the extreme case of 1 when
complete coverage is in place). Hence, they face the trade-off of charging a high price and
selling only to non-shoppers, or charging a low price to try to sell also to shoppers, which leads
them to randomize over prices.
Then, the price distribution for the case in which the market consists of n vendors, and the
price-comparison search engine has an unbiased index of size k ≤ n, is identical to the price
distribution for the case in which the price-comparison search engine has Complete Coverage,
k = n, and the market consists of k vendors: Fu(·;n,k) = Fc(·;k).
As discussed in more detail in GGPP, an unbiased decrease in the size of the index has two
impacts. First, for indexed vendors, the decrease in the size of the index reduces the number
of rivals with which a vendor has to compete to sell to shoppers from k− 1 to k− 2. This
increases the probability that an indexed vendor will have the lowest price, (1−Fu)k−1, which
increases the Volume of Sales effect. The first impact leads vendors to shift probability mass
from higher to lower prices. As a consequence, the price distribution shifts to the left. Second,
the decrease in the size of the index reduces the probability that a given vendor is indexed from
k/n to (k−1)/n, which reduces the Volume of Sales effect. The second impact leads vendors to
raise the lower bound of the support, and to shift probability mass from lower to higher prices.
As a consequence, the price distribution rotates. The total impact of an unbiased decrease in the
size of the index is to cause the price distribution to rotate counter clock-wise.
The increase in the lower bound of the support, lu(k)< lu(k−1), raises the expected price
paid by shoppers. However, the average price paid in the market remains constant and equal
to λ . This implies that the expected price by non-shoppers decreases. Recall that vendors
now charge lower prices with a higher probability. Shoppers and non-shoppers have conflicting
interests with respect toUnbiased Incomplete Coverage, as compared with Complete Coverage.
Shoppers prefer a large to a small unbiased index, and non-shoppers prefer a small to a large
unbiased index.
Under Unbiased Incomplete Coverage, the equilibrium price distribution does not depend
on the number of vendors in the market, Fu(·;n,k) = Fu(·;n+1,k). The probability with which
a vendor is indexed, k/n, depends on the number of vendors. Besides, each vendor’s share of
non-shoppers, λ/n, also depends on the number of vendors.
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Given that Fu(·;n,k) = Fc(·;k), comparing the price distributions under Unbiased Incom-
plete Coverage, Fu(·;n,k), and under Complete Coverage, Fc(·;n), is equivalent to comparing
Fu(·;n,k) and Fu(·;n,n), i.e., is equivalent to analyzing the impact of an increase in the size
of the index, under Unbiased Incomplete Coverage. Thus, compared with Complete Cover-
age, Unbiased Incomplete Coverage causes the price-comparison to rotate counter-clockwise,
which increases the expected price paid by shoppers and decreases the expected price paid by
non-shoppers.
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We run four treatments labeled according to the numbering followed in GGPP. Thus, treatments
T1, T2, T4 and T5 reported here refer to a 2x2 design resulting from the combination of two val-
ues of n∈ {3,6}with two values of k/n∈ {2/3,1}. In terms of the theoretical model, the design
can be used to test the model’s hypotheses concerning the size of the market under complete
coverage by comparing a complete coverage triopoly (T1) to a complete coverage hexapoly,
(T4). Furthermore, by comparison of T1 to T2 and T4 to T5, we can test the model’s hypothe-
ses concerning the completeness of the index. In fact, both incomplete coverage treatments are
run with a 2/3 probability of a seller being indexed by the search engine. Thus, in treatment 2
we use k = 2 and in treatment 5 we set k = 4.
Contrary to the experiments in GGPP, in which a number of interacting human agents were
randomly matched every period of the session, in this study, we face each subject with simulated
subjects whose behavior is extracted from the corresponding mixed strategy equilibrium distri-
bution. In this way, we isolate individual behavior from noisy interaction and learning by other
players. As observed by Cason and Datta (2006), the overlapping of noises and errors occur-
ring due to human agents’ action and interaction should be mitigated by inducing (simulated)
optimal behavior on some part of the market.
The prices set by robot players were randomly extracted from the theoretical distributions
using the transformation method (Press et al., 1992). The experiment was run using a specific
software programmed in Java. Each subject participating in treatments T1 and T2 is faced in
each period with 2 simulated players, whereas each subject in treatments 4 and 5 is faced with
another 5 simulated players. In order to guarantee that obseved heterogeneity can be genuinely
attributed to differences across individuals we have maintained the actual realizations of the
simulated players fixed within each treatment. Subjects were told that the objectives pursued by
“others” were identical to those induced to each one of them according to the instructions.2 In
that sense, strategic interaction among human players and simultaneous learning by them does
not affect individual decision making, as each subject competes in a market in which other’s
behavior corresponds to mixed strategy equilibrium play.
Like in GGPP, our design includes implementing Sabater and Georgantzís’ (2002) lottery
panel methodology as a parallel experiment, designed to capture our subjects’ attitude towards
risk. Subjects are offered the 4 panels of lotteries presented in table 1. Each lottery involves
a probability q of earning a monetary reward of X Euros, and a probability 1− q of earning 0
Euros. Each one of the 4 panels is constructed using a fixed certain payoff, c = 1 Euro, above
2. An English translation of the Instructions to the subjects is provided in the appendix.
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TABLE 1
Panels of lotteries
Panel 1
q 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
X € 1.00 1.12 1.27 1.47 1.73 2.10 2.65 3.56 5.40 10.90
Choice
Panel 2
q 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
X € 1.00 1.20 1.50 1.90 2.30 3.00 4.00 5.70 9.00 19.00
Choice
Panel 3
q 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
X € 1.00 1.66 2.50 3.57 5.00 7.00 10.00 15.00 25.00 55.00
Choice
Panel 4
q 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
X € 1.00 2.20 3.80 5.70 8.30 12.00 17.50 26.70 45.00 100
Choice
which expected earnings, qX , were increased by a ratio h times the probability of not winning,
1− q, as implied by the formula: qX = c+ h(1− q). That is, an increase in the probability
of the unfavorable outcome is linearly compensated by an increase in the expected payoff. We
use 4 different risk return parameters, h = 0.1,1,5,10, implying an increase in the return of
risky choices as we moved from one panel to the next. By inspection, the farther right the
subject chooses, the less risk averse he is, whereas risk neutral (risk loving) subjects would
choose q = 0.1 in all panels. In fact, it can be checked that an expected utility maximizing
subject with utility U(X) = X1/t would choose the lottery with probability q = (1− 1/t)(1+
c/h), which, apart from the aforementioned intuitively expected outcome, also predicts that the
subject should choose riskier lotteries as we move from panel 1 to panel 4. Thus, for risk-averse
subjects, their sensitivity to the attraction implied by a higher h can be approximated by the
difference in their choices across subsequent panels.
An alternative test of risk attitudes was used in order to obtain a more complete picture
of our subjects’ risk attitudes. We have implemented the Low Payment binary lottery choice
task presented in Holt and Laury (2002, table 1) using the same nominal rewards expressed in
Euros. The test is based on binary choices among a set of lottery pairs constructed to elicit a
subject’s switching point from a safer to a riskier option. Both this and the lottery panel test
were implemented with real rewards in a recruiting session organized a day before the main
experiment. During the recruiting session, a questionnaire-based psychometric test was also
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FIGURE 1
Average panel choice histogram.
TABLE 2
Risk Measure Correlations
Avg HL Z SR
HL 0.2866
Z 0.1162 0.1400
SR 0.1899 0.1557 −0.0738
SP 0.1820 0.1137 0.1622 0.6431
run. The test combined Zuckerman’s (1978) Sensation Seeking Scale and a psychometric test
of Sensitivity to Rewards and Punishments3. The former is a four-subscale assessment of a
subject’s attraction (or repulsion) to risky activities. The latter is a two-subscale assessment of
a subject’s attraction to rewards and repulsion towards punishment.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Risk attitudes
Figure 1 presents an histogram on our subjects’ choices in the lottery panel test averaged across
the four panels. Figure 2 contains the corresponding average choice histogram for data obtained
in GGPP. Figure 3 contains histograms corresponding to subjects’ choices in each one of the
four panels. Figure 4 presents the corresponding histograms for data obtained in GGPP. A weak
but systematic tendency is observed according to which our subjects have, at a population level,
3. The test can be found in Torrubia et al. (2001).
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FIGURE 2
Average panel choice histogram (GGPP).
chosen riskier lotteries as the return to risk is increased from panel 1 to panel 4.4 Choices peak
on the 50%−50% lottery in 7 out of the 8 histograms.
Figure 5 presents an histogram on results obtained from the Holt and Laury (2002) test.
Figures 6 and 7 contain respectively results obtained from Zuckerman’s (1978) test and its four
subscales (Z1–Z4). Finally, histograms on the sensitivity to rewards (SR) and punishments (SP)
are provided in figure 8. Table 2 contains correlations between attitude measures obtained in the
recruiting session. Except for the well documented correlation (0.64) between sensitivities to
punishments and rewards, only the correlation between the Holt and Laury (2002) lotteries and
the lottery panel test lies close to the 0.3 threshold. This indicates that risk attitudes revealed
within the economic domains are the only ones that should be expected to be (weakly) correlated
as shown in Figure 9. Furthermore, an even higher correlation of the Holt and Laury (2002) test
is obtained with choices in the first of the four panels, whose rewards lie closer to those of the
aforementioned binary choice test (Figure 10).
4. A thorough discussion on the violation of this pattern at an individual level is provided in Georgantzís et
al. (2003).
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FIGURE 3
Panel choice histograms.
10
P1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
(a) Panel 1
P2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
(b) Panel 2
P3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
(c) Panel 3
P4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
(d) Panel 4
FIGURE 4
Panel choice histograms (GGPP).
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FIGURE 7
Z’s histograms.
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Regression of HL on Avg.
15
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
HL vs P1
P1
H
L
FIGURE 10
Regression of HL on P1.
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FIGURE 11
Empirical vs. theoretical cumulative price distributions.
4.2. Pricing behavior
We discuss the basic features of the observed pricing behavior in comparison with previous
experiments in which all firms were represented by human subjects. In all cases, observed
cumulative distributions are plotted against the corresponding theoretical predictions.
Figures 11 and 12, respectively compare the cumulative price distributions obtained here
and in GGPP with the corresponding theoretical equilibrium distributions. Table 3 presents
statistics of the price distributions obtained in the sessions with simulated “others” and human
agents alone against the corresponding theoretical predictions. Generally, speaking, competing
against simulated equilibrium play does not seem to systematically reduce the gap between
predicted and observed behavior. In fact, in treatments with six sellers in the market (T4, T5)
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FIGURE 12
Empirical vs. theoretical cumulative price distributions (GGPP).
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TABLE 3
Price distributions statistics
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. StdDev
Treatment 1
Theoretical 0.2500 0.3721 0.5714 0.6046 0.8421 1.0000 0.2481
All human 0.1000 0.2750 0.3890 0.5351 0.9200 1.0000 0.3033
Simulated 0.1800 0.3000 0.3925 0.5024 0.6700 1.0000 0.2501
Treatment 2
Theoretical 0.3333 0.4000 0.5000 0.5493 0.6667 1.0000 0.1778
All human 0.2000 0.5968 0.7470 0.7597 0.9900 1.0000 0.1937
Simulated 0.1000 0.3880 0.4525 0.5970 1.0000 1.0000 0.2817
Treatment 4
Theoretical 0.1429 0.4126 0.8421 0.7081 0.9942 1.0000 0.1429
All human 0.0020 0.2497 0.9940 0.6998 1.0000 1.0000 0.3712
Simulated 0.1200 0.1823 0.2500 0.4721 1.0000 1.0000 0.3601
Treatment 5
Theoretical 0.2000 0.3721 0.6667 0.6476 0.9412 1.0000 0.2000
All human 0.0100 0.2220 0.5690 0.5923 1.0000 1.0000 0.3683
Simulated 0.0290 0.2500 0.3000 0.4590 0.6000 1.0000 0.2855
the gap is increased in a systematic way: higher density is observed on lower prices. The only
clear decrease of the predicted-observed gap is observed in the case of treatment 2.
Figures 13 and 14 organize the same graphs in a way which enables us to test the predictive
power of the theoretical model’s comparative statics. Like in the case of GGPP, the only hypoth-
esis which is systematically confirmed concerns the comparison between T1 and T4 referring
to the prediction concerning the number of firms in the market under complete coverage. Thus,
the general hypothesis (HG in GGPP) concerning the rotation of price distribution clockwise
with increases in the number of firms in the market (Varian, 1980) is robust to the alternative
designs implemented here and in GGPP.
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FIGURE 13
Comparisons of cumulative price distributions.
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FIGURE 14
Comparisons of cumulative price distributions (GGPP).
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4.3. Risk and pricing behavior
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FIGURE 15
Price distributions by degree of risk aversion: Avg.
Unlike GGPP, in which a single measure of risk attitudes was used, we can compare here the
two economic domain-related tests with respect to their role as a criterion for classifying and
organizing the observed pricing behavior. In order to do that, we classify the subjects according
to their choices in the two tests under three equally sized groups labeled as high, low and
medium risk aversion. In order to obtain a clearer result we take the low and high risk aversion
ones and compare their corresponding cumulative price distributions. This is done in figures 15
and 16. Both tests seem to indicate that, in treatment 1, low risk aversion subjects set prices
with an accumulation point on p= 1 leading to cumulative distributions which rotate clockwise
with respect to the prices of high risk aversion subjects. Treatment 2 and 4 data are organized in
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FIGURE 16
Price distributions by degree of risk aversion: HL.
totally different ways by classifications under the two alternative tests, as the lottery panel test
predicts that low risk aversion subjects’ prices have more density on higher prices (especially
on p= 1), while the Holt and Laury (2002) lotteries predict just the contrary. Finally, while the
Holt and Laury (2002) test cannot distinguish between behavior by low and high risk aversion
subjects in treatment 5, the lottery panel test predicts that low risk aversion subjects’ prices in
treatment 5 have a higher density on higher prices. In fact, the prediction that highly risk averse
subjects set lower prices is also consistent with the corresponding result reported by GGPP
on session in which all agents were represented by human subjects. The consistency of the
prediction of the lottery panel test for treatments 4 and 5 offers a possible explanation for the
systematic deviation between observed and predicted behavior in these treatments as reported
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in the comment on figure 11. That is, the observed higher density on lower prices may be the
result of behavior by highly risk averse subjects.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We report results from an experiment aimed to extend our previous work on pricing behavior
in markets with Internet-assisted consumer search. The richer description of subjects’ attitudes
towards risk elicited in environments within the economic domain and the isolation of individual
behavior form uncontrolled, “other-regarding” beliefs and behavior have produced new insights
on the relation between individual decision making and strategic interaction in settings leading
to equilibrium price dispersion.
The present design extends the GGPP experiment in two different ways. First, we aim at
studying individual behavior in isolation of factors concerning the behavior of “others” and
subjects’ uncontrolled beliefs with respect to rival risk preferences and thus pricing behavior.
In order to do that, we have run sessions in which rather than using interacting human agents,
we have faced each subject with a market in which the behavior of “others” is simulated and
corresponds to realizations of a variable distributed according to equilibrium price distributions.
This is an important step towards a better understanding of individual behavior in the presence
of mixed strategy equilibrium play in isolation of other uncontrolled sources of uncertainty
related with the subject-matching protocol and the typology of human behavior or subjects’
beliefs regarding their rivals’ types.
Second, we have used psychometric and economic tests to elicit our subjects preferences
towards risk. We find that the latter can be used to meaningfully organize the observed pricing
behavior. However, the resulting taxonomy of risk-related effects on pricing, may differ de-
pending on the test used. This is despite the fact that there is some correlation between the two
tests used here, especially in cases in which the stakes are of similar sizes.
However, the lottery panel test rather consistently predicts that both under complete and
incomplete coverage of prices in markets with many firms, highly risk averse players set lower
prices, which may serve as an explanation of the systematic deviation of observed prices from
the theoretical prediction in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. In the presence of
few firms and complete coverage of prices by the search engine, both tests agree on the fact that
low risk aversion subjects’ price distributions rotate clockwise with respect to those posted by
highly risk averse subjects.
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A. APPENDIX: INSTRUCTIONS OF THE MAIN EXPERIMENT (TRANSLATED FROM
SPANISH)
• The purpose of this experiment is to study how subjects take decisions in specific eco-
nomic contexts. The approximate duration of the session will be of on hour and a half.
This experiment is part of a research project which has received public financial support.
Therefore, your decision making in this session is going to be of great importance for the
success of this research. Follow the instructions carefully. At the end of the session you
will receive an amount of money in cash that will depend on your performance during the
session. We describe next the economic scenario in which the decision making will take
place.
• The environment is an industry characterized by:
(a) A number of firms which will remain constant through the session. Each firm pro-
duces a homogeneous product, and this product is the same for all firms,
(b) A price comparison search engine like the ones on the Internet,
(c) 1,200 consumers.
• You are one of the firms in the industry. At the beginning of the session, the number of
firms in the industry will appear at your screen.
• The session will consists of 50 rounds. Each round you and the rest of the firms in the
industry have to decide the price at which you want to sell the product. Price is your only
decision variable.
• For simplicity, your production costs are zero, so that, each period, your profits will be
equal to your revenue (PRICE x N of consumers you sell to).
• Each period, the Price Search Engine lists the price of all (Treatments 2 and 5:several but
not all) firms in the industry. (Treatments 2 and 5:The number of firms which will be part
of the search engine will appear at your screen at the beginning of the session.)
• In particular, the search engine chooses randomly the firms that are going to be part of it
in each period, and the prices of that firms will be included in the list.
• Transactions will take place in UMEX, our lab’s Experimental Monetary Unit.
• Each consumer wants to buy one unit of the product per round. The maximumwillingness
to pay of each consumer for a unit of the product is 1,000 UMEX. That is, if the price you
fix is higher than 1,000 UMEX, no body will buy from you.
• There are two types of consumers. Half of them are consumers who read the list of prices
created by price search engine. The other half do not actually read the list of prices of
the search engine (maybe because they are not able to do so). The master program of the
computer will simulate the consumers’ reactions.
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• The consumers who read the price list of the search engine will buy, each period, from
the firm whose price for that period is the lowest among all prices included in the price
list, if such price does not exceed 1,000 UMEX. In case of a “tie” (i.e. several firms fix
the same minimum price) the consumers are distributed evenly among the firms with the
same minimum price.
• The consumers who do not read the search engine’s price list will buy ramdomly from
any vendor, so that this group of consumers will be distributed evenly among all firms in
the industry.
• In each round, the firms you compete with will be randomly selected among the 18 par-
ticipants of this session. Therefore, the probability of competing with the same firms in 2
different periods is very low.
Feedback
• At the end of each round, you will see on your screen the information of (Treatments 2
and 5: of whether you were part of the search engine), your own sales and your earnings
for that round.
• All over the session, you will see on your screen a history that includes information about
you own sales, your earnings, and the prices fixed by your competitors in the past.
Payoffs
• At the end of the session you will be paid in cash. Your reward will be determined taking
into account the earnings you accumulate over 10 (randomly selected) out of the total 50
periods. The exchange rate will be: 1,000,000 UMEX = 12€ (if you are part of a market
of 3 firms), or 1,000,000 UMEX = 24 € (if you are part of a market of 6 firms).
Thank you very much for your collaboration. Good luck!
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